Threats on the stability of a financial system may severely affect the functioning of the entire economy, and thus considerable emphasis is placed on the analyzing the cause and effect of such threats. The financial crisis in the current and past decade has shown that one important cause of instability in global markets is the so-called financial contagion, namely the spreadings of instabilities or failures of individual components of the network to other, perhaps healthier, components. This leads to a natural question of whether the regulatory authorities could have predicted and perhaps mitigated the current economic crisis by effective computations of some stability measure of the banking networks. Motivated by such observations, we consider the problem of defining and evaluating stabilities of both homogeneous and heterogeneous banking networks against propagation of synchronous idiosyncratic shocks given to a subset of banks. We formalize the homogeneous banking network model of Nier et al. [46] and its corresponding heterogeneous version, formalize the synchronous shock propagation procedures outlined in [25, 46] , define two appropriate stability measures and investigate the computational complexities of evaluating these measures for various network topologies and parameters of interest. Our results and proofs also shed some light on the properties of topologies and parameters of the network that may lead to higher or lower stabilities.
Introduction and Motivation
In market-based economies, financial systems perform important financial intermediation functions of borrowing from surplus units and lending to deficit units. Financial stability is the ability of the financial systems to absorb shocks and perform its key functions, even in stressful situations. Threats on the stability of a financial system may severely affect the functioning of the entire economy, and thus considerable emphasis is placed on the analyzing the cause and effect of such threats. The concept of instability of a market-based financial system due to factors such as debt financing of investments can be traced back to earlier works of the economists such as Irving Fisher [29] and John Keynes [37] during the 1930's Great Depression era. Subsequently, some economists such as Hyman Minsky [44] have argued that:
Such instabilities are inherent in many modern capitalist economies.
In this paper, we investigate systemic instabilities of the banking networks, an important component of modern capitalist economies of many countries. The financial crisis in the current and past decade has shown that an important component of instability in global financial markets is the so-called financial contagion, namely the spreadings of instabilities or failures of individual components of the network to other, perhaps healthier, components. The general topic of interest in this paper, motivated by the global economic crisis in the current and the past decade, is the phenomenon of financial contagion in the context of banking networks, and is related to the following natural extension of the question posed by Minsky and others:
• What is the true characterization of such instabilities of banking networks, i.e., -Are such instabilities systemic, e.g., caused by a repeal of Glass-Steagall act with subsequent development of specific properties of banking networks that allowed a ripple effect [14] ?
-Or, are such instabilities caused just by a few banks that were "too big to fail" and/or "a few individually greedy executives" ?
To investigate these types of questions, one must first settle the following issues:
• What is the precise model of the banking network that is studied?
• How exactly failures of individual banks propagated through the network to other banks?
• What is an appropriate stability measure and what are the computational properties of such a measure?
As prior researchers such as Allen and Babus [1] pointed out,graph-theoretic concepts provide a conceptual framework within which various patterns of connections between banks can be described and analyzed in a meaningful way by modeling banking networks as a directed network in which nodes represent the banks and the links represent the direct exposures between banks. Such a network-based approach to studying financial systems is particularly important for assessing financial stability, and in capturing the externalities that the risk associated with a single or small group of institutions may create for the entire system. Conceptually, links between banks have two opposing effects on contagion:
• More interbank links increase the opportunity for spreading failures to other banks [32] : when one region of the network suffers from a crisis, another region also incurs a loss because their claims on the troubled region fall in value and, if this spillover effect is strong enough, it can cause a crisis in adjacent regions.
• More interbank links provide banks with a form of coinsurance against uncertain liquidity flows [2] , i.e., banks can insure against the liquidity shocks by exchanging deposits through links in the network.
The Banking Network Model

Rationale Behind the Model
As several prior researchers such as [1, 25, 39, 46] have already commented, graph-theoretic frameworks may provide a powerful tool for analyzing stability of banking and other financial networks. We provide and use a mathematically precise abstraction of a banking network model as outlined in [46] and elsewhere. The same or very similar version of the graph-theoretic loss propagation model used in this paper has also been extensively used by prior researchers in finance, economics and banking industry to study various properties and research questions involving banking systems similar to what is studied in this paper (e.g., see [5, 19, 31, 45, 49] , to name a few). As commented by researchers such as [5, 46] :
the modelling challenge in studying banking networks lies not so much in analyzing a model that is flexible enough to represent all types of insolvency cascades, but in studying a model that can mimic the empirical properties of these different types of networks.
A loss propagation model such as the one discussed here and elsewhere such as in [5, 19, 31, 45, 49] conceptualises the main characteristics of a financial system using network theory by relating the cascading behavior of financial networks both to the local properties of the nodes and to the underlying topology of the network, allowing us to vary continuously the key parameters of the network.
Homogeneous Networks: Balance Sheets and Parameters for Banks
We provide a precise abstraction of the model as outlined in [46] which builds up on the works of Eboli [25] . The network is modeled by a weighted directed graph G = (V, F) of n nodes and m directed edges, where each node v ∈ V corresponds to a bank (Bank v ) and each directed edge (v, v ′ ) ∈ F indicates that Bank v has an agreement to lend money to Bank v ′ . Let deg in (v) and deg out (v) denote the in-degree and the out-degree of node v. The model has the following parameters: E = total external asset, I = total inter-bank exposure, A = I + E = total asset [0, 1] ∋ γ = percentage of equity to asset, w = w(e) = I m = weight of edge e ∈ F, Φ = severity of shock (1 ≥ Φ > γ) Now, we describe the balance sheet for a node v ∈ V (i.e., for Bank v ) 1 1 This model assumes that all the depositors are insured for their deposits, e.g., in United States the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation provides such an insurance up to a maximum level. Thus, we will omit the parameters d v for all v in the rest of the paper when using the model. Similarly, ℓ v quantities (which depend on the d v 's) are also only necessary in writing the balance sheet equation and will not be used subsequently.
Note that the homogeneous model is completely described by the 4-tuple of parameters G, γ, I, E .
Balance Sheets and Parameters for Heterogeneous Networks
The heterogeneous version of the model is the same as its' homogeneous counterpart as described above, except that the shares of interbank exposures and external assets for different banks may be different. Formally, the following modifications are done in the homogeneous model:
• w(e) > 0 denotes the weight of the edge e ∈ E along with the constraint that ∑ e∈F w(e) = I.
• ι v = ∑ e= (v,v Denoting the m-dimensional vector of w(e)'s by w and the n-dimensional vector of α v 's by α α α, the heterogeneous model is completely described by the 6-tuple of parameters G, γ, I, E, w,α α α . (a) Homogeneous version of the network
• w = weight of every edge = I /m = 1.
•
(b) Heterogeneous version of the network Suppose that 95% of E is distributed equally on the two banks v 1 and v 2 , and the rest 5% of E is distributed equally on the remaining three banks. Thus: Suppose that 95% of I is distributed equally on the three edges
, and the remaining 5% of I is distributed equally on the remaining four edges
Idiosyncratic Shock [25, 46]
As in [46] , our initial failures are caused by idiosyncratic shocks which can occur due to operations risks (frauds) or credit risks, and has the effect of reducing the external assets of a selected subset of banks perhaps causing them to default. While aggregated or correlated shocks affecting all banks simultaneously is relevant in practice, idiosyncratic shocks are a cleaner way to study the stability of the topology of the banking network. Formally, we select a non-empty subset of nodes (banks) / 0 ⊂ V shock ⊆ V . For all nodes v ∈ V shock , we simultaneously decrease their external assets from e v by s v = Φ e v , where the parameter Φ ∈ (0, 1] determines the "severity" of the shock. As a result, the new net worth of Bank v becomes c ′ v = c v − s v . The effect of this shock is as follows:
• If c ′ v ≥ 0, Bank v continues to operate but with a lower net worth of c ′ v .
• If c ′ v < 0, Bank v defaults (i.e., stops functioning).
Propagation of an Idiosyncratic Shock [25, 46]
We use the notation c v (t) to denote c v at time t, and t + 0 to denote any t > t 0 . Let V alive (t) ⊆ V be the set of nodes that have not failed at time t and let G alive (t) = (V alive (t), F alive (t)) be the corresponding nodeinduced subgraph of G at time t with deg in (v,t) and deg out (v,t) denote the in-degree and out-degree of a node v ∈ V alive (t) in the graph G alive (t). In a continuous-time model, the shock propagates as follows:
(* remove Bank v from network if it is to fail at this step *) Table 1 : Discrete-time idiosyncratic shock propagation for T steps.
• If a banks equity ever becomes negative, it fails subsequently, i.e., ∀t 0 ≥ 1 :
• A failed bank Bank v at time t = t 0 affects the net worth (equity) of all banks that gave loan to Bank v in the following manner. For each edge (u, v) ∈ F alive (t 0 ) in the network at time t 0 , the equity c u (t 0 ) is decreased by an amount 2 of
. Thus, the shock propagation is defined by the following differential equation:
An intuitive explanation of the two quantities inside the summation in the above equation is as follows. The term (v,t) ensures that the total loss propagated is no more than the total interbank exposure of the failed bank.
A discrete-time version of the above can be obtained by the obvious method of quantizing time and replacing the partial differential equations by "difference equations". With appropriate normalizations, the discrete-time model for shock propagation is described by a synchronous iterative procedure shown in Table 1 where t = 1, 2, . . . , T denotes the discrete time step at which the synchronous update is done (T ≤ n).
An inarborescence graph.
A simplified illustration of the effect of idiosyncratic shocks Consider the case when the model is homogeneous and the topology of the graph G is inarborescence, i.e., a directed rooted tree where all edges are oriented towards the root. Consider two nodes u, v ∈ V such that (v, u) ∈ F and deg in (v) = 0 (see Fig. 2 ). Suppose that at time t = 1 the node u is shocked and consequently it defaults. The amount of shock transmitted from u to v is
Network formation Babus [7] proposed a model in which banks form links with each other as an insurance mechanism to reduce the risk of contagion. In contrast, Castiglionesi and Navarro [15] studied decentralization of the network of banks that is optimal from the perspective of a social planner. In a setting in which banks invest on behalf of depositors and there are positive network externalities on the investment returns, fragility arises when "not sufficiently capitalized" banks gamble with depositors' money. When the probability of bankruptcy is low, the decentralized solution well-approximates the first objective of Babus.
Contagion spread in networks
Although ordinarily one would expect the risk of contagion to be larger in a highly interconnected banking system, some empirical simulations indicate that shocks have an extremely complex effect on the network stability in the sense that higher connectivity among banks may sometimes lead to lower risk of contagion. Allen and Gale [2] studied how a banking system may respond to contagion when banks are connected under different network structures, and found that, in a setting where consumers have the liquidity preferences as introduced by Diamond and Dybvig [23] and have random liquidity needs, banks perfectly insure against liquidity fluctuations by exchanging interbank deposits, but the connections created by swapping deposits expose the entire system to contagion. Allen and Gale concluded that incomplete networks are more prone to contagion than networks with maximum connectivity since better-connected networks are more resilient via transfer of proportion of the losses in one bank's portfolio to more banks through interbank agreements. Freixas et al. [30] explored the case of banks that face liquidity fluctuations due to the uncertainty about consumers withdrawing funds. Gai and Kapadia [32] argued that the higher is the connectivity among banks the more will be the contagion effect during crisis. Haldane [34] suggested that contagion should be measured based on the interconnectedness of each institution within the financial system. Liedorp et al. [42] investigated if interconnectedness in the interbank market is a channel through which banks affect each others riskiness, and argued that both large lending and borrowing shares in interbank markets increase the riskiness of banks active in the dutch banking market.
Dasgupta [21] explored how linkages between banks, represented by cross-holding of deposits, can be a source of contagious breakdowns by investigating how depositors, who receive a private signal about fundamentals of banks, may want to withdraw their deposits if they believe that enough other depositors will do the same. Lagunoff and Schreft [41] considered a model in which agents are linked in the sense that the return on an agents' portfolio depends on the portfolio allocations of other agents. Iazzetta and Manna [35] used network topology analysis on monthly data on deposits exchange to gain more insight into the way a liquidity crisis spreads. Nier et al. [46] explored the dependency of systemic risks on the structure of the banking system via network theoretic approach and the resilience of such a system to contagious defaults. Kleindorfer et al. [39] argued that network analyses can play a crucial role in understanding many important phenomena in finance. Corbo and Demange [20] explored, given the exogenous default of set of banks, the relationship of the structure of interbank connections to the contagion risk of defaults. Babus [8] studied how the trade-off between the benefits and the costs of being linked changes depending on the network structure, and observed that, when the network is maximal, liquidity can be redistributed in the system to make the risk of contagion minimal.
The Stability and Dual Stability Indices
A banking network is called dead if all the banks in the network have failed. Consider a given homogeneous or heterogeneous banking network G, γ,
The Stability Index The optimal stability index of a network G is defined as
For estimation of this measure, we assume that it is possible for the network to fail, i.e., SI * (G, T ) < ∞. Thus, 0 < SI * (G, T ) ≤ 1, and the higher the stability index is, the better is the stability of the network against an idiosyncratic shock. We thus arrive at the natural computational problem STAB T,Φ . We denote an optimal subset of nodes that is a solution of Problem STAB T,Φ by V shock , i.e., SI
if T ≥ n then the STAB T,Φ finds a minimum subset of nodes which, when shocked, will eventually cause the death of the network in an arbitrary number of time steps.
Input: a banking network with shocking parameter Φ, Input: a banking network with shocking parameter Φ, and an integer T > 1 and two integers T, The Dual Stability Index Many covering-type minimization problems in combinatorics have a natural maximization dual in which one fixes a-priori the number of covering sets and then finds a maximum number of elements that can be covered with these many sets. For example, the usual dual of the minimum set covering problem is the maximum coverage problem [38] . Analogously, we define a dual stability problem DUAL-STAB T,Φ,κ . The dual stability index of a network G can then be defined as
The dual stability measure is of particular interest when SI * (G, T ) = ∞, i.e., the entire network cannot be made to fail. In this case, a natural goal is to find out if a significant portion of the nodes in the network can be failed by shocking a limited number of nodes of G; this is captured by the definition of DSI * (G, T, κ).
Violent Death vs. Slow Poisoning
In our results, we distinguish two cases of death of a network:
violent death (T = 2) The network is dead by the very next step after the shock.
slow poisoning (any T ≥ 2) The network may not be dead immediately but dies eventually.
Rationale Behind the Stability Measures
Although it is possible to think of many other alternate measures of stability for networks than the ones defined in this paper, the measures introduced here are in tune with the ideas that references [25, 46] directly (and, some other references such as [31, 49] implicitly) used to empirically study their networks by shocking only a few (sometimes one) node. Thus, a rationale in defining the stability measures in the above manner is to follow the cue provided by other researchers in the banking industry in studying models such as in this paper instead of creating a completely new measure that may be out of sync with ideas used by prior researchers and therefore could be subject to criticisms. Models for propagation of beneficial or harmful attributes have been investigated in the past in several other contexts such as influence maximization in social networks [13, 16, 17, 36] , disease spreading in urban networks [18, 26, 27] , percolation models in physics and mathematics [48] and other types of contagion spreads [11, 12] . However, the model for shock propagation in financial network discussed in this paper is fundamentally very different from all these models. For example, the cascade models of failure considered in [11, 12] are probabilistic models of failure propagation of a more generic nature, and thus not very useful to study failure propagation via interlocked balance sheets of financial institutions (as is the case in OTC derivatives markets). Some distinguishing features of our model include:
-At t = 3, node d (and similarly node e) receives a shock of the amount
Thus, both these nodes fail at t = 3 and the entire network is dead.
As the above example shows, if shocking a subset of nodes makes a network dead, adding more nodes to this subset may not necessarily lead to the death of the network, and the stability measure is neither monotone nor sub-modular. Similarly, it is also possible to exhibit banking networks such that to make the entire network fail:
• it may be necessary to shock a node even if it does not fail since shocking such a node "weakens" it by decreasing its equity, and
• it may be necessary to shock a node even if it fails due to shocks given to other nodes.
The complexity of the computational aspects of many previous attribute propagation models arise due to the presence of cycles in the graph; for example, see [16] for polynomial-time solutions of some of these problems when the underlying graph does not have a cycle. In contrast, our computational problems are may be hard even when the given graph is acyclic; instead, a key component of computational complexity arises due to two or more directed paths sharing a node.
Network type, result type
bound, assumption (if any), corresponding theorem
Homogeneous T = 2 approximation hardness
(1 − ε) ln n, NP DTIME n log log n , Theorem 8.1
Acyclic, ∀ T > 1, approximation hardness APX-hard, Theorem 10.1 (1 − ε) ln n, NP DTIME n log log n , Theorem 12.1 Acyclic, ∀ T > 3, approximation hardness 2 log 1−ε n , NP DTIME(n poly(log n) ), Theorem 14.1
Theorem 13.1 ‡ ‡ ‡ See Theorem 13.1 for definitions of some parameters in the approximation ratio. † † † See page 43 for statement of assumption (⋆), which is weaker than the assumption P NP. Table 2 : A summary of our results; ε > 0 is any arbitrary constant and 0 < δ < 1 is some constant. Table 2 summarizes our results, where the notation poly (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ) denotes a constant-degree polynomial in variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k . Our results for heterogeneous networks show that the problem of computing stability indices for them is harder than that for homogeneous networks, as one would naturally expect.
Overview of Our Results and Their Implications on Banking Networks
Brief Overview of Proof Techniques
Homogeneous Networks, STAB
, approximation hardness and approximation algorithm The reduction for approximation hardness is from a corresponding inapproximability result for the dominating set problem for graphs. The logarithmic approximation almost matches the lower bound. Even though this algorithmic problem can be cast as a covering problem, one cannot explicitly enumerate exponentially many covering sets in polynomial time. Instead, we reformulate the problem to that of computing an optimal solution of a polynomial-size integer linear programming (ILP), and then use the greedy approach of [24] for approximation. A careful calculation of the size of the coefficients of the ILP ensures that we have the desired approximation bound.
, approximation hardness and exact algorithm The APX-hardness result, which holds even if the degrees of all nodes are small constants, is via a reduction from the node cover problem for 3-regular graphs. Technical complications in the reduction arise from making sure that the generated graph instance of STAB T,Φ is acyclic, no new nodes fail for any t > 3, but the network can be dead without each node being individually shocked. If the network is a rooted in-arborescence and every node can be individually shocked to fail, then we design an O n 2 time exact algorithm via dynamic programming; as a by product it also follows that the value of the stability index of this kind of network with bounded node degrees is large.
Homogeneous Networks, DUAL-STAB T,Φ,κ DUAL-STAB T,Φ,κ DUAL-STAB T,Φ,κ
Any T T T , approximation hardness and exact algorithm For hardness, we translate a lower bound for the maximum coverage problem [28] . The reduction relies on the fact that in dual stability measure every node of the network need not fail. If the given graph is a rooted in-arborescence and every node can be individually shocked to fail, we provide an O n 3 time exact algorithm via dynamic programming.
Heterogeneous Networks, STAB T,Φ STAB T,Φ STAB T,Φ
Any T T T , approximation hardness
The reduction is from a corresponding inapproximability result for the minimum set covering problem. Unlike homogeneous networks, unequal shares of the total external assets by various banks allows us to encode an instance of set cover by "equalizing" effects of nodes.
The approximation algorithm uses linear program in Theorem 9.1 with more careful calculations.
approximation hardness This stronger poly-logarithmic inapproximability result than that in Theorem 12.1 is obtained by a reduction from MINREP, a graph-theoretic abstraction of two prover multiround protocol for any problem in NP. Many technical complications in the reduction, culminating to a set of 22 symbolic linear equations between the parameters that we must satisfy. Intuitively, the two provers in MINREP correspond to two nodes in the network that cooperate to fail to another specified set of nodes.
Heterogeneous Networks, DUAL-STAB 2,Φ,κ
DUAL-STAB 2,Φ,κ DUAL-STAB 2,Φ,κ , approximation hardness The reduction for this stronger inapproximability result is from the densest hyper-graph problem.
Implications of Our Results on Banking Networks
Effects of Topological Connectivity
Though researchers agree that the connectivity of banking networks affects its stability [2, 32] , the conclusions drawn are mixed, namely some researchers conclude that lesser connectivity implies more susceptibility to contagion whereas other researchers conclude in the opposite. Based on our results and their proofs, we found that topological connectivity does play a significant role in stability of the network in the following complex manner.
Even acyclic networks display complex stability behavior: Sometimes a cause of the instability of a banking network is attributed to cyclical dependencies of borrowing and lending mechanisms among major banks, e.g., banks v 1 , v 2 and v 3 borrowing from banks v 2 , v 3 and v 1 , respectively. Our results show that computing the stability measures may be difficult even without the presence of such cycles. Indeed, larger inapproximability results, especially for heterogeneous networks, are possible because slight change in network parameters can cause a large change in the stability measure. On the other hand, acyclic small-degree rooted in-arborescence networks exhibit higher values of the stability measure, e.g., if the maximum in-degree of any node in a rooted in-arborescence is 5 and the shock parameter Φ is no more than twice the value of the percentage of equity to assets γ, then by Theorem 11.1 SI
Intersection of borrowing chains may cause lower stability: By a borrowing chain we mean a directed path from a node v 1 to another node v 2 , indicating that bank v 2 effectively borrowed from bank v 1 through a sequence of successive intermediaries. Now, assume that there is another directed path from v 1 to another node v 3 . Then, failure of v 2 and v 3 propagates the resulting shocks to v 1 and, if the shocks arrive at the same step, then the total shock received by bank v 1 is the addition of these two shocks, which in turn passes this "amplified" shock to other nodes in the network.
Based on these kinds of observations, it can be reasonably inferred that homogeneous networks with topologies more like a small-degree in-arborescence have higher stabilities, whereas networks of other types of topologies may have lower stabilities even if the topologies are acyclic. For example, as we observe later, when deg max in = 3, γ = 0.1 and Φ = 0.15, we get SI * (G, T ) > 0.22 and the network cannot be put to death without shocking more than 22% of the nodes.
Effects of Ratio of External to Internal Assets (E/I) and percentage of equity to assets (γ) for Homogeneous Networks
As our relevant results and their proofs show, lower values of E/I and γ may cause the network stability to be extremely sensitive with respect to variations of other parameters of a homogeneous network. For example, in the proof of Theorem 8.1 we have lim n→∞ E /I = lim n→∞ γ = 0, leading to variation of the stability index by a logarithmic factor; however, in the proof of Theorem 10.1 we have E /I = 0.25 and γ = 0.23 leading to much smaller variation of the stability index.
Homogeneous vs. Heterogeneous Networks
Our results and proofs show that heterogeneous networks of banks with diverse equities tend to exhibit wider fluctuations of the stability index with respect to parameters, e.g., Theorem 14.1 shows a polylogarithmic fluctuation even if the ratio E/I is large.
Further Empirical Study
Subsequent to writing this paper, DasGupta and Kaligounder in a separate article [22] performed a thorough empirical analysis of the stability measure over more than 700000 combinations of networks types and parameters, and uncovered many interesting insights into the relationships of the stability with other relevant parameters of the network, such as:
Effect of uneven distribution of assets: Networks where all banks have roughly the same external assets are more stable over similar networks in which fewer banks have a disproportionately higher external assets compared to the remaining banks, and failures of those banks with higher assets contribute more damage to the stability of the network. Furthermore, networks in which fewer banks have a disproportionately higher external assets compared to the remaining banks has a minimal instability even if their equity to asset ratio is large and comparable to loss of external assets. This is not the case for networks where all banks have roughly the same external assets. Thus, in summary, they concluded that banks with disproportionately large external assets ("banks that are too big") affect the stability of the entire banking network in an adverse manner.
Effect of connectivity:
For banking networks where all banks have roughly the same amount of external assets, higher connectivity leads to lower stability. In contrast, for banking networks in which few banks have disproportionately higher external assets compared to the remaining banks, higher connectivity leads to higher global stability.
Correlated versus random failures:
Correlated initial failures of banks causes more damage to the entire banking network as opposed to just random initial failures of banks.
Phase transition properties of global stability:
The global stability exhibits several sharp phase transitions for various banking networks within certain parameter ranges. (b) Let t last be the latest time a node of G failed, and let V (t) be the set of nodes that failed at time t = 1, 2, . . . , t last . Then,
Preliminary Observations on Shock Propagation
if u was last node that transmitted any part of the shock to v before v failed. Note that (u, v) is also an edge of G and for every node v ∈ V (i + 1) there must be an edge (u, v) for some node u ∈ V (i). Thus, G has a path of length at least t last .
(c) This holds since otherwise the stability measures can be computed separately on each weakly connected component.
8 Homogeneous Networks, STAB 2,Φ STAB 2,Φ STAB 2,Φ , Logarithmic Inapproximability Theorem 8.1. SI * (G, 2) cannot be approximated in polynomial time within a factor of (1 − ε) ln n, for any constant ε > 0, unless NP ⊆ DTIME n log log n .
Proof. The dominating set problem for an undirected graph (DOMIN-SET) is defined as follows: given an undirected graph G = (V, F ) with n = |V | nodes, find a minimum cardinality subset of nodes V ′ ⊂ V such that every node in V \ V ′ is incident on at least one edge whose other end-point is in V ′ . It is known that DOMIN-SAT is equivalent to the minimum set-cover problem under L-reduction [9] , and thus cannot be approximated within a factor of (1 − ε) ln n unless NP ⊆ DTIME n log log n [28] .
Consider an instance G = (V, F) of DOMIN-SET with n nodes and m edges, and let OPT denote the size of an optimal solution for this instance. Our (directed) banking network
We set the global parameters as follows: E = 10 n, γ = n −2 and Φ = 1.
For a node v, let Nbr(v) = { u | {u, v} ∈ E } be the set of neighbors of v in G. We claim that if a node v is shocked at time t = 1, then all nodes in in {v} ∪ Nbr(v) fail at time t = 2. Indeed, suppose that v is shocked at t = 1. Then, v surely fails because
Now, consider t = 2 and consider a node v such that v has not failed but a node u ∈ Nbr(v) failed at time t = 1. Then, node v surely fails because
Thus, we have a 1-1 correspondence between the solutions of DOMIN-SET and death of 
Proof. Suppose that Φe u < 0 for some node u ∈ V . Then, there exists an optimal solution in which we do not shock the node u. Indeed, if u was shocked, the equity of u increases from c u to c u + | Φ e u | and u does not propagate any shock to other nodes. Thus, if u still fails at t = 2, then it also fails at t = 2 if it was not shocked. Let V shock denote the set of nodes that we will select for shocking, and, for every node v ∈ V , let δ v,u be defined as:
. Then, our problem reduces to a covering problem of the following type:
find a minimum cardinality subset V shock ⊆ V such that, for every node u,
Note that we cannot even explicitly enumerate, for a node u ∈ V , all subsets V ′ ⊆ V \ {u} such that ∑ v∈V ′δ v,u > c u , since there are exponentially many such subsets. Let the binary variable x v ∈ {0, 1} be the indicator variable for a node v ∈ V for inclusion in V shock . However, we can reformulate our problem as the following integer linear programming problem:
that every non-zero entry is at least 1. Since the coefficients of the constraints and the objective function are all positive real numbers, (1) can be approximated by the greedy algorithm described in [24, Theorem 4.1] with an approximation ratio of 2 + ln n + ln max v∈V ∑ u∈V
. Now, observe that:
and thus, max v∈V ∑ u∈V
, giving the approximation bound. Proof. We reduce the 3-MIN-NODE-COVER problem to STAB T,Φ . 3-MIN-NODE-COVER is defined as follows. We are given an undirected 3-regular graph G, i.e., an undirected graph G = (V, F ) in which the degree of every node is exactly 3 (and thus |F| = 1.5 |V |). A valid solution (node cover) is a subset of nodes V ′ ⊆ V such that every edge is incident to at least one node in V ′ . The goal is then to find a node cover V ′ ⊆ V such that |V ′ | is minimized. This problem is known to be APX-hard [10] . Given such an instance G = (V, F) of 3-MIN-NODE-COVER, we construct an instance of the banking network
• For every node v i ∈ V , we have two nodes u i , u ′ i in − → V , and a directed edge (u i , u ′ i ). We refer to u ′ i as a "super-source" node.
• For every edge {v i , v j } ∈ F with i < j, we have a ("sink") node e i, j in − → V and two directed edges (e i, j , u i ) and (e i, j , u j ) in − → F . For notational convenience, the node e i, j is also sometimes referred to as the node e j,i . Fig. 4 for an illustration. Observe that:
• deg in (u i ) = 3 and deg out (u i ) = 1 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , |V |.
• deg in (u ′ i ) = 1 and deg out (u ′ i ) = 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , |V |. Thus, by Proposition 7.1(a), every node u ′ i must be shocked to make the network fail. • deg in (e i, j ) = 0 and deg out (e i, j ) = 2 for all i and j. Since deg in (e i, j ) = 0, if a node e i, j is shocked, no part of the shock is propagated to any other node in the network.
• Since the longest path in − → G has 2 edges, by Proposition 7.1(b) no new node fails at any t > 3.
For notational convenience, let n = |V |, E = E/n, and e i, j 1 , e i, j 2 and e i, j 3 be the three edges {v i , v j 1 }, {v i , v j 2 } and {v i , v j 3 } in G that are incident on the node v i . We will select the remaining network parameters, namely γ, Φ and E , based on the following desirable properties.
(I) If a node u ′
i is shocked at t = 1, it fails:
(II) If a node e i, j is shocked, it does not fail:
(III) If a node u i is shocked at t = 1, then u i fails at t = 1, and the nodes e i, j 1 , e i, j 2 and e i, j 3 fail at time t = 2 if they were not shocked (see Fig. 5 for an illustration):
The above inequality is satisfied provided:
(IV) Consider a sink node e i, j . Then, we require that if one or both of the super-source node u ′ i and u ′ j are shocked at t = 1 but the none of the nodes u i , u j and e i, j were shocked, then we require that one or both of the corresponding nodes u i and u j fail at t = 2, but the node e i, j never fails. Pictorially, we want a situation as depicted in Fig. 6 . This is satisfied provided the following inequalities hold:
(IV-1) u i fails at t = 2 if u ′ i was shocked (the case of u j and u ′ j is similar):
(IV-2) e i, j never fails even if both u i and u j have failed:
The above inequality is satisfied provided: 
Figure 6: Case (IV): to make e 2,3 fail, at least one of u 2 or u 3 must be shocked.
There are obviously many choices of parameters γ, Φ and E that satisfy Equations (2)- (9); here we exhibit just one. Let E = 1 which satisfied Equation (3). Choosing γ = 0.23 satisfies Equations (5), (7) and (9) . Letting Φ = 0.7 satisfies Equations (2), (4), (6) and (8) .
Suppose that V ′ ⊂ V is a solution of 3-MIN-NODE-COVER. Then, we shock all the super-nodes, and the nodes in V ′ . By (I) and (III) all the super-nodes and the nodes in ∪ v i ∈V \V ′ {v i } fails at t = 1, and by (III) the nodes in ∪ {v i ,v j }∈E i< j {e i, j } fails t = 2. Thus, we obtain a solution of − → G by shocking |V ′ | + n nodes.
Conversely, consider a solution of the STAB T,Φ problem on − → G . Remember that all the super-nodes must be shocked, which ensures that we need to shock n + a nodes for some integer a ≥ 0, and that any node v i that is not shocked will fail at t = 2. By (II) it is of no use to shock the sink nodes. Thus, the shocked nodes consist of all super-nodes and a subset V ′ of cardinality a of the nodes u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n . By (IV) for every node e i, j at least one of the nodes u i or u j must be in U . Thus, the set of nodes {v i | u i ∈ U } form a node cover of G of size a.
That the reduction is an L-reduction follows from the observation that any locally improvable solution of 3-MIN-NODE-COVER has between n/3 and n nodes.
Restricted Homogeneous Networks, STAB T,Φ STAB T,Φ STAB T,Φ , Any T , Exact Solution
The APX-hardness result of In the rest of this section, we prove the above theorem. Let G = (V, F) be the given in-arborescence rooted at node r. We will use the following notations and terminologies:
• u → v and u v denote a directed edge and a directed path of one of more edges, respectively, from node u to node v.
• If (u, v) ∈ F then v is the parent of u and u is a child of v. Similarly, if u v exists in G then v an ancestor of u and u a descendent of v.
• Let ∇(u) = { v | u v exists in G } denote the set of all proper ancestors of u, and ∆(u) = { v | v u exists in G } ∪ {u} denote the set of all descendants of u (including the node u itself). Note that for the network G to fail, at least one node in ∇(u) ∪ {u} must be shocked for every node u.
Suppose that we shock a node u of G (and shock no other nodes in ∆(u)). If u fails, then the shock splits and propagates to a subset of nodes in ∆(u) until each split part of the shock terminates because of one of the following reasons:
• the component of the shock reaches a "leaf" node v with deg in (v) = 0, or
• the component of the shock reaches a node v with a sufficiently high c v such that v does not fail.
Based on the above observations, we define the following quantities. Definition 11.3 (see Fig. 7 for illustrations) . The influence zone of a shock on u, denoted by iz(u), is the set of all failed nodes v ∈ ∆(u) within time T when u is shocked (and, no other node in ∆(u) is shocked). Note that u ∈ iz(u).
Note that, for any node u, iz(u) can be computed in O(n) time.
Lemma 11.4. For any node u, iz(
Proof. For notational simplicity, let E = E/n. If the node u does not fail when shocked, or u fails but it has no child, then iz(u) ≤ 1 and our claim holds since Φ > γ. Otherwise, u fails and each of its deg in (u) children at level 2 receives a part of the shock given by Consider a child v of u. Each node v ′ ∈ ∆(v) that fails due to the shock subtracts an amount of γ (deg in (v ′ ) + E ) ≥ γ (1 + E ) from provided this subtraction does not result in a negative value. Thus, the total number of failed nodes is strictly less than 1 + deg in (u)
Remark 11.5. The bound in Lemma 11.4 is tight as shown in Fig. 8 .
Lemma 11.4 immediately implies that
We now provide a polynomial time algorithm to compute SI * (G, T ) exactly assuming each node can be shocked to fail individually. For a node u, define the following:
is the number of nodes in an optimal solution of STAB T,Φ for the subgraph induced by the nodes in ∆(u) (or ∞, if there is no feasible solution of STAB T,Φ for this subgraph under the stated conditions) assuming the following:
-u was not shocked, and -no node in the path u ′ u excluding u ′ was shocked.
• SI * SAS (G, T, u) is the number of nodes in an optimal solution of STAB T,Φ for the subgraph induced by the nodes in ∆(u) (or ∞, if there is no feasible solution of STAB T,Φ under the stated conditions) 3 assuming that the node u was shocked (and therefore failed).
We consider the usual partition of the nodes of G into levels: level(r) = 1 and level(u) = level(v) + 1 if u is a child of v. We will compute SI with the highest level and proceeding to successive lower levels. By Observation 7.1(a), the root r must be shocked to fail for the entire network to fail, and thus SI * SAS (G, T, r) will provide us with our required optimal solution.
Every node u at the highest level has deg in (u) = 0. In general, SI * 
SAS (G, T, u) and SI
SAS (G, T, u)
Computing SI * SANS (G, T, u, u ′ ) when deg in (u) > 0: Since u ′ is shocked and u is not shocked, the following cases arise:
• If u iz(u ′ ) then then u does not fail. Thus, there is no feasible solution for the subgraph induced by the nodes in ∆(u) under this condition, and SI * SANS (G, T, u, u ′ ) = ∞.
• Otherwise, u ∈ iz(u ′ ), and therefore u fails when u ′ is shocked. For each child v i of u, there are two options: v i is shocked and fails, or v i is not shocked. Thus, in this case we have
Let ℓ max be the maximum level number of any node in G. Based on the above observations, we can design the dynamic programming algorithm as shown in Fig. 9 to compute an optimal solution of STAB T,Φ on G.
It is easy to check that the running time of our algorithm is O n 2 .
Heterogeneous Networks, STAB T,Φ STAB T,Φ STAB T,Φ , Any T , Logarithmic Inapproximability
Theorem 12.1. Assuming NP DTIME n log log n , for any constant 0 < ε < 1 and any T , it is impossible to approximate SI * (G, T ) within a factor of (1 − ε) ln n in polynomial time even if G is a DAG.
(* preprocessing *) ∀u ∈ V : compute iz(u) (* dynamic programming *) for ℓ = ℓ max , ℓ max −1, . . . , 1 do for each node u at level ℓ do if deg in (u) = 0 then Proof. The (unweighted) SET-COVER problem is defined as follows. We have an universe U of n elements, a collection of m sets S over U . The goal is to pick a sub-collection S ′ ⊆ S containing a minimum number of sets such that these sets "cover" U , i.e., ∪ S∈S ′ S = U . It is known that there exists instances of SET-COVER that cannot be approximated within a factor of (1 − δ ) ln n, for any constant 0 < δ < 1, unless NP ⊆ DTIME n log log n [28] . Without any loss of generality, one may assume that every element u ∈ U belongs to at least two sets in S since otherwise the only set containing u must be selected in any solution.
SAS (G, T, r) as the solution
Given such an instance U , S of SET-COVER, we now construct an instance of the banking network G = (V, F) as follows:
• We have a special node B.
• For every set S ∈ S , we have a node S, and a directed edge (S, B).
• For every element u ∈ U , we have a node u, and directed edges (u, S) for every set S that contains u.
Thus, |V | = n + m + 1, and |F| < n m + m. See Fig. 10 for an illustration. We set the shares of internal assets for each bank as follows:
• For each set S ∈ S , if S contains k > 1 elements then, for each element u ∈ S, we set the weight of the edge e = (u, S) as w(e) = 3 k .
• For each set S ∈ S , we set the weight of the edge (S, B) as 1.
Thus, I = 4m. Also, observe that:
• For any S ∈ S , b S = 3, and ι S = 1.
• For any u ∈ U , b u = 0. Also, since u belongs to at least two sets in S and any set has at most n − 1 elements, 2 n ≤ ι u < 3n 2 .
• b B = m and ι B = 0.
• Since deg in (u) = 0 for any element u ∈ U , if a node u is shocked, no part of the shock is propagated to any other node in the network.
• Since the longest path in G has 2 edges, by Proposition 7.1(b) no new node in G fails for T > 3.
Let the share of external assets for a node (bank) y be denoted by E y (thus, ∑ y∈V E y = E). We will select the remaining network parameters, namely γ, Φ and the E y values, based on the following properties.
(I) If the node B is shocked at t = 1, it fails:
(II) For any S ∈ S , if node S is shocked at t = 1, then S fails at t = 1, and, for every u ∈ S, node u fails at time t = 2:
The above inequality is satisfied if:
(III) For any u ∈ U , consider the node u, and let S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S p ∈ S be the p sets that contain u. Then, we require that if the node B is shocked at t = 1 then B fails at t = 1, every node among the set of nodes { S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S p } that was not shocked at t = 1 fails at t = 2, but the node u does not fail if the none of the nodes u, S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S p were shocked, This is satisfied provided the following inequalities hold:
(III-1) Any node among the set of nodes { S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S p } that was not shocked at t = 1 fails at t = 2. This is satisfies provided for any set S ∈ S the following holds:
(III-2) u does not fail if the none of the nodes u, S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S p were shocked:
The above inequality is satisfied provided: (16) There are many choices of parameters γ, Φ and E y 's satisfying Equations (10)-(16); we exhibit just one:
Suppose that S ′ ⊂ S is a solution of SET-COVER. Then, we shock the node B and the nodes S for each S ∈ S ′ . By (I) and (II) the node B and the nodes S for each S ∈ S ′ fails at t = 1, and by (II) the nodes u for every u ∈ U fails t = 2. Thus, we obtain a solution of G by shocking |S ′ | + 1 nodes.
Conversely, consider a solution of the STAB T,Φ problem on G. If a node u for some u ∈ U was shocked, we can instead shock the node S for any set S that contains a, which by (II) still fails all the nodes in the network and does not increase the number of shocked nodes. Thus, after such normalizations, we may assume that the shocked nodes consist of B and a subset S ′ ⊆ S of nodes. By (II) and (III) for every node u ∈ U at least one set that contains u must be in S ′ . Thus, the collection of sets in S ′ form a cover of U of size |cS ′ |. . Then,
giving the desired approximation bound.
14 Heterogeneous Networks, STAB T,Φ STAB T,Φ STAB T,Φ , T > 3, Poly-logarithmic Inapproximability Theorem 14.1. Assuming NP DTIME n poly(log n) , for any constant 0 < ε < 1 and any T > 3, it is impossible to approximate SI * (G, T ) within a factor of 2 log 1−ε n in polynomial time even if G is a DAG.
Proof. The MINREP problem (with minor modifications from the original setup) is defined as follows. We are given a bipartite graph G = (V left ,V right , F) such that the degree of every node of G is at least 10, a partition of V left into The following result is a consequence of Raz's parallel repetition theorem [40, 47] .
Theorem 14.2. [40]
Let L be any language in NP and 0 < δ < 1 be any constant. Then, there exists a reduction running in n poly(log n) time that, given an input instance x of L, produces an instance of MINREP such that:
• if x L then MINREP has a solution of size at least (α + β ) · 2 log 1−δ n .
Thus, the above theorem provides a 2 log 1−δ n -inapproximability for MINREP under the complexitytheoretic assumption of NP DTIME n polylog(n) .
Let
, {u, v} ∈ F . We now show our construction of an instance of
is constructed as follows (see Fig. 11 for an illustration):
Nodes: • For every super-edge h i, j of G super , we have a node − → h i, j in − → G . There are |F super | such nodes.
• We have one "top super-node" v top , one "side super-node" v side , and 2 |F| additional nodes B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B |F| ,
Edges:
• For every node u of G, we have an edge u, v top in − → G . There are n such edges.
• For every edge {u, v} of G, we have two Figure 11 : Reduction of an instance of MINREP to STAB T,Φ for heterogeneous networks.
• For every super-edge h i, j of G super and for every edge f u,v in F i, j , we have an edge
There are |F| such edges.
• Let p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p |F| be any arbitrary ordering of the edges in F. Then, for every j = 1, 2, . . . , |F|, we have the edges (v side , B j ), (B j , D j ) and (D j , p j ). The total number of such edges is 3|F|.
Distribution of internal assets:
We set the weight of every edge to 1, Thus,
Let deg(u) ≥ 10 be the degree of node u ∈ V left ∪V right . Observe that:
• b v top = n, and ι v top = 0. Since deg out v top = 0, by Proposition 7.1(a) the node v top must be shocked to make the network fail.
• b v side = |F|, and ι v side = 0. Since deg out (v side ) = 0, by Proposition 7.1(a) the node v side must be shocked to make the network fail.
• For any u ∈ V left ∪V right , b− → u = deg(u) and ι− → u = 1.
• For every node
, if such a node is shocked, no part of the shock is propagated to any other node in the network.
• For every j,
• Since the longest directed path in G has 4 edges, by Proposition 7.1(b) no new node in G fails for t > 4.
Let the share of external assets for a node (bank) y be denoted by E y (thus, ∑ y∈V E y = E). We will select the remaining network parameters, namely γ, Φ and the set of E y values, based on the following desirable properties and events. For the convenience of the readers, all the relevant constraints are also summarized in Table 3 . Assume that no nodes in
were shocked at t = 1.
(I) Suppose that the node v top is shocked at t = 1. Then, the following happens.
(I-a) v top fails at t = 1:
was not shocked at t = 1 fails at t = 2:
These constraints are satisfied provided:
(I-c) If the nodes − → u , − → v and f− → u , − → v were not shocked at t = 1, then the part of the shock, say σ 1 , given Table 3 : List of all inequalities to be satisfied in the proof of Theorem 14.1.
to v top that is received by node f− → u , − → v at t = 3 is:
On the other hand, if the node f− → u , − → v and exactly one of the nodes − → u and − → v , say − → u , were not shocked at t = 1, then the part of the shock, say σ ′ 1 , given to v top that is received by node f− → u , − → v at t = 3 is:
(II) Suppose that some node − → u is shocked at t = 1. Then, the following happens.
(II-a) Node − → u fails at t = 1:
, j fails at t = 2 and node − → h i, j fails at t = 3 if both − → u and − → v were shocked at t = 1:
These constraints are satisfied provided the inequalities (17)- (20) are satisfied, and the following holds:
(III) When the node v side is shocked at t = 1, the following happens.
(III-a) v side fails at t = 1:
which is same as (17) .
(III-b) If a node B j ∈ B is shocked at t = 1, it does not fail:
(III-c) Any node B j ∈ B fails at t = 2 irrespective of whether B j was shocked or not:
(III-d) If a node D j ∈ D is shocked at t = 1, it does not fail (and thus, by (III-b), it does not fail at t = 2 also):
(III-e) Any node D j ∈ D fails at t = 3 irrespective of whether D j was shocked or not:
These constraints are satisfied provided all the previous constraints hold and the following holds:
The maximum value of its proportion of shock receive by p j from this path, say σ 2 , is obtained by shocking all the nodes v side , B j , D j and is given by (assuming all previous inequalities hold):
Similarly, the minimum value of its proportion of shock receive by p j from this path, say σ 2 , is obtained by shocking only the node v side and is given by (assuming all previous inequalities hold):
We want node f− → u , − → v to fail at t = 4 assuming it did not fail already. Since f− → u , − → v did not fail at t = 2, at most one of the nodes − → u and − → v was shocked. There are two cases to consider: when neither − → u nor − → v was shocked, or when exactly one of these nodes, say − → v , was shocked (assuming all previous inequalities hold):
(IV) By (II-b) node − → h i, j fails at t = 3 provided both the nodes − → u and − → v were shocked at t = 1. Our goal is to make sure that node − → h i, j does not fail in any other condition (assuming the node itself was not shocked). Assuming the nodes − → u , − → v and f− → u , − → v were not shocked, the maximum amount of shock that f− → u , − → v ∈ − → F i, j can receive is when all the nodes before f− → u , − → v in the path
were shocked and no more than one of the nodes − → u or − → v was shocked. Based on this, the following constraints must hold for − → h i, j not to fail.
On the other hand, if exactly one of the nodes − → u or − → v , say − → u , was shocked at t = 1, then the maximum amount of shock that f− → u , − → v ∈ − → F i, j can receive is is modified, and the new conditions for our desired goal become as follows.
There are many choices of parameters γ, Φ and E y 's satisfying inequalities (17)- (26); we exhibit just one:
Remembering that 10 ≤ deg(u) < n for any node u ∈ V left ∪V right and |F i, j | < |F|, it is relatively straightforward to verify that all the inequalities are satisfied for all sufficiently large n. Note that
and thus the ratio of total external assets to total internal assets E/I is large. We can now finish our proof by selecting δ such that log 1−δ n = log 1−ε | − → V | − 1 and showing the following:
(soundness) If every solution of MINREP on G is of size at least (α + β )2 log 1−δ n then Proof of Soundness (every solution of MINREP is of size at least (α + β )2 log 1−δ n )
Proof of
We will prove the logically equivalent contrapositive of our claim, i.e., we will show that if SI * − → G , T < 
by (III-e) every node in D fails at t = 3, by (III-f) every node f− → u , − → u fails at t = 4 unless it was shocked at t = 1 and by (IV) a node − → h i, j fails only if − → h i, j , f ovru,ovru ∈ − → F i, j or both the nodes − → u and − → v were shocked at t = 1. We "normalize" this given solution in the following manner (each step of the normalization assumes that the previous steps have been already carried out):
• If a node from D ∪ B was shocked at t = 1, we do not shock it. By (III) this has no effect on the failure of the network.
• If a node f− → u , − → v ∈ − → F i, j was shocked, we do not shock it but instead shock the nodes − → u and − → v if they were not already shocked in the given solution. This at most doubles the number of nodes shocked and, by (II-b), the node f u,v fails at t = 2 and the node − → h i, j fails at t = 3 if it was not shocked at t = 1. Thus, after this sequence of normalization steps, we may assume that no f− → u , − → v node was shocked.
• If a node − → h i, j was shocked at t = 1, we do not shock it but instead shock the nodes − → u and − → v (for some u and v such that {u, v} ∈ F i, j ) if they were not already shocked in the given solution. This at most doubles the number of nodes shocked and, by (II-b), the node f u,v fails at t = 2 and the node − → h i, j fails at t = 3. Thus, after this sequence of normalization steps, we may assume that no − → h i, j node was shocked.
These normalizations result in a solution of STAB T,Φ of size at most 2 z in which the nodes v top , v side , a Proof. (a) The max κ-cover problem is defined as follows. An instance of the problem is an universe U of n elements, a collection of m sets S over U , and a positive integer κ. The goal is to pick a sub-collection S ′ ⊆ S of κ sets such that the number of elements covered, namely ∪ S∈S ′ S , is maximized. Let OPT denote the maximum number of elements covered by an optimal solution of the max κ-cover problem. It was shown in [28] that, assuming P NP, the max κ-cover problem cannot be approximated within a factor
for any constant δ > 0. More precisely, [28] provides a polynomial-time reduction for a restricted but still NP-hard version of the Boolean satisfiability problem (3-CNF5) instances of max κ-cover with κ = U α , for some constant 0 < α < 1, and shows that (1) if the CNF formula is satisfiable, then OPT = U ;
(2) if the CNF formula is not satisfiable, then OPT < 1 − 1 e + g(κ) U , where g(κ) → 0 as κ → ∞.
Our reduction from max κ-cover to DUAL-STAB T,κ is as follows 4 . In our graph G = (V, F), we have an element nodeũ for every element u ∈ U , a set nodeS for every set S ∈ S , and directed edges (ũ,S) for every element u ∈ U and set S ∈ S such that u ∈ S. Thus, n = |V | = |U | + |S | and |F| = ∑ S∈S |S|. We now set the remaining parameters as follows: E = n, γ = n −2 and Φ = 1. Now, we observe the following:
• If an element nodeũ is shocked, it does not fail since Φ deg in (ũ) − deg out (ũ) + E n ≤ 0 whereas γ deg in (ũ) + E n = n −2 > 0.
• If a set nodeS is shocked, it fails since Φ deg in S − deg out S + E n ≥ 2 whereas γ deg in S + E n ≤ n+1 n 2 < 1.
• If a set nodeS is shocked, then every element nodeũ for u ∈ S fails at t = 2. To observe this, note that min Φ deg in S − deg out S + 
E n
• Since the longest directed path in G has one edge, no new nodes fails during t > 2.
Based on the above observations, one can identify the sets selected in max k-cover with the set nodes selected for shocking in DUAL-STAB T,κ on G to conclude that DSI * (G, T, κ) = OPT + κ. Thus, using (1) and (2), inapproximability gap is To provide a polynomial time algorithm for DSI * (G, T, κ), we suitably modify the algorithm described in the proof of Theorem 11.1. We redefine SI * SANS (G, T, u, v) and SI * SAS (G, T, u) in the following manner:
• For every node u ′ ∈ ∇(u) and every integer 0 ≤ k ≤ κ, DSI * SANS (G, T, u, u ′ , k) is the number of nodes in an optimal solution of DUAL-STAB T,Φ,κ (or ∞ if there is no feasible solution of DUAL-STAB T,Φ,κ ) for the subgraph induced by the nodes in ∆(u) assuming the following:
-u ′ was shocked, -u was not shocked, -no node in the path u ′ u except u ′ was shocked, and -total number of shocked nodes in ∆(u) is exactly k.
• For every integer 0 ≤ k ≤ κ, DSI * SAS (G, T, u, k) is the number of nodes in an optimal solution of DUAL-STAB T,Φ,κ for the subgraph induced by the nodes in ∆(u) (or ∞, if there is no feasible solution of STAB T,Φ under the stated conditions) assuming that the node u was shocked (and therefore failed), and the number of shocked nodes in ∆(u) is exactly k.
Computing these quantities becomes slightly more computationally involved as shown below. • The cost of selecting k i objects of the type O i is min DSI *
• The goal is to select a total of exactly ̥ objects such that the total cost is minimum.
The standard pseudo-polynomial time dynamic programming algorithm for Knapsack can be used to solve the above instance in O k deg in (u) = O n 2 time. Thus, the total running time of our algorithm is O n 3 .
16 Heterogeneous Networks, DUAL-STAB 2,Φ,κ DUAL-STAB 2,Φ,κ DUAL-STAB 2,Φ,κ , Stronger Inapproximability
We show that DSI * (G, 2, κ) cannot be approximated within a large approximation factor provided a complexitytheoretic assumption is satisfied. To understand this assumption, we recall the following definitions from [6] . • For every hyper-edge e = (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u d ) ∈ F, we have d edges (e, u 1 ), (e, u 2 ), . . . , (e, u d ) ∈ − → F . We set the weight (share of internal asset) of every edge (e, u i ) to 2. Thus, |I| = 2dm.
Let the share of external assets for a node (bank) − → y ∈ − → V be denoted by E− → y (thus, ∑− → y ∈ − → V E− → y = E). We will select the remaining network parameters as follows. For each e ∈ F, E− → e = 1.99d, and for each u ∈ V , E− → u = 0. Thus, E = 1.99dm. Finally, we set Φ = 1 and γ = 1 /2. We prove the following: 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have formalized a model for idiosyncratic propagation of shocks to a banking network, defined two possible stability measures, provided their computational properties and discussed the implications of our results on the banking system. We view our work as a necessary first step towards understanding vulnerabilities of banking systems due to sudden loss of external assets, and hope that it will generate sufficient interests in both the banking network community and the network algorithms community to further investigate and refine these stability issues.
